The pleasant or unpleasant qualities that attach to our perceptions help to determine whether we approach or avoid environmental stimuli, shaping their affordances. How do brains create this affective perceptual dimension? The traditional answer is that sensory areas serve only as conduits for external impressions that are then modulated by heteromodal limbic structures in subsequent phases. Here we raise the possibility that, in addition to these well established gain control effects, sensory systems might also have a more direct role in representing the pleasantness component of perception, as supported by several strands of recent brain imaging evidence. In conjunction with a shared valence code that is independent of its sensory origins, valence representations interleaved within sensory brain areas may support finer grained experiential distinctions between how things look, sound, feel, taste and smell good or bad to us, offering a higher dimensional space of evaluative discriminations.
Introduction
In modular, cognitivist architectures of the mind, perception is segregated from affect, cognition and action, serving as the entry portal for impressions from the outside world [1] . Yet in natural settings animals do not wait to be activated by external stimuli -they spontaneously explore their surroundings, energized by expectations that are continuously updated through brain-body-environment interactions [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Sensory inflows, rather than mediating a passive transfer of information from the exterior world, function largely to constrain endogenous brain activities with the aim of satisfying the mandates of survival and reproduction [3, 5] . External stimuli are simultaneously integrated with the organism's learning history and current physiological state, enabling sensory networks to rapidly extract the meaning and behavioral significance of environmental signals [6] [7] [8] . In this dynamicist model there is no 'pure' perception stage that precedes the affective consequences of selecting particular actions [3, 9 ].
The chief constraints operating on action-perception loops are those pertaining to primordial computations of good and bad (hedonic valence) [3,9 ,10] . A number of models have been advanced as mechanistic accounts of how affectively salient stimuli amplify perceptual, attentional and mnemonic processes [11] [12] [13] [14] . Inherent to these models is the concept that the affective qualities of stimuli modify perceptual function via re-entrant projections from heteromodal cortico-limbic structures. Sensory systems themselves have not been classically implicated as constituting components of hedonics beyond their role as mere conduits for exteroceptive inputs that are subject to gain control effects in a separate step. The representational space of the visual system, for instance, remains confined to the coordinate space of canonical physical features like orientation, contrast and spatial frequencies [15] . Here, we consider a complementary, and more radical possibility that elementary attributes of hedonic valence are also partially embedded within sensory areas alongside physical stimulus features [16] . With several exceptions [9 ,17 ,18,19] , this concept is presently not widely entertained in the affective sciences.
Modality general coding of valence
Researchers have long assumed the existence of a single supramodal hedonic system that allows you to experience your cup of espresso, the smell of freshly cut grass and a gentle caress as pleasurable, each in its own right [20, 21] . A common pleasure currency permits comparing discrepant forms of stimulation and the selection of appropriate courses of action [22, 23] . Our recent findings from representational similarity analysis (RSA) (see Figure 1) indicate that in lieu of regional specificity for negative and positive valence, the representational geometry of activity patterns in the ventromedial and orbitofrontal cortices (OFC) supports affective discriminations across 
